xref: /aosp_15_r20/system/sepolicy/private/fsck_untrusted.te (revision e4a36f4174b17bbab9dc043f4a65dc8d87377290)

typeattribute fsck_untrusted coredomain;

use_bootstrap_libs(fsck)

# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };

# Allow stdin/out back to vold
allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };

# Run fsck on vold block devices
allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;

allow fsck_untrusted proc_mounts:file r_file_perms;

# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
# major/minor values.
allow fsck_untrusted dev_type:blk_file getattr;

###
### neverallow rules
###

# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
neverallow fsck_untrusted {
  boot_block_device
  frp_block_device
  metadata_block_device
  recovery_block_device
  root_block_device
  swap_block_device
  system_block_device
  userdata_block_device
  cache_block_device
  dm_device
}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;

# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;

# fsck_untrusted should never have sys_admin permissions. If it requires sys_admin
# permissions, that is a code mistake that needs to be fixed, not a permission that
# should be granted. Same with setgid and setuid.
neverallow fsck_untrusted self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid sys_admin };

###
### dontaudit rules
###

# Ignores attempts to access sysfs. fsck binaries seem to like trying to go
# here, but nothing bad happens if they can't, and they shouldn't be allowed.
dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs_dm:file rw_file_perms;
dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs_dm:dir rw_dir_perms;

# Ignore attempts to access tmpfs. fsck don't need to do this.
dontaudit fsck_untrusted tmpfs:lnk_file read;