xref: /aosp_15_r20/system/sepolicy/prebuilts/api/34.0/public/cameraserver.te (revision e4a36f4174b17bbab9dc043f4a65dc8d87377290)

# cameraserver - camera daemon
type cameraserver, domain;
type cameraserver_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
type cameraserver_tmpfs, file_type;

binder_use(cameraserver)
binder_call(cameraserver, binderservicedomain)
binder_call(cameraserver, appdomain)
binder_service(cameraserver)

hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_camera)

hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator)

allow cameraserver ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow cameraserver dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

# Talk with graphics composer fences
allow cameraserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;

add_service(cameraserver, cameraserver_service)
add_service(cameraserver, fwk_camera_service)
add_hwservice(cameraserver, fwk_camera_hwservice)

allow cameraserver activity_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver appops_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver cameraproxy_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver package_native_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver permission_checker_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver sensor_privacy_service:service_manager find;
allow cameraserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;

allow cameraserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
allow cameraserver hal_camera_service:service_manager find;

# Allow to talk with surfaceflinger through unix stream socket
allow cameraserver surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write };

###
### neverallow rules
###

# cameraserver should never execute any executable without a
# domain transition
neverallow cameraserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;

# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
# hardware/content. Etc.
#
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow cameraserver domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
neverallow cameraserver { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;

# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
allow cameraserver adbd:fd use;
allow cameraserver adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
allow cameraserver shell:fd use;
allow cameraserver shell:unix_stream_socket { read write };
allow cameraserver shell:fifo_file { read write };

# Allow to talk with media codec
allow cameraserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_allocator)

# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow cameraserver su:fd use;
  allow cameraserver su:fifo_file { read write };
  allow cameraserver su:unix_stream_socket { read write };
')