xref: /aosp_15_r20/system/sepolicy/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/domain.te (revision e4a36f4174b17bbab9dc043f4a65dc8d87377290)

# Transition to crash_dump when /system/bin/crash_dump* is executed.
# This occurs when the process crashes.
# We do not apply this to the su domain to avoid interfering with
# tests (b/114136122)
domain_auto_trans({ domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }, crash_dump_exec, crash_dump);
allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;

# Allow every process to check the heapprofd.enable properties to determine
# whether to load the heap profiling library. This does not necessarily enable
# heap profiling, as initialization will fail if it does not have the
# necessary SELinux permissions.
get_prop(domain, heapprofd_prop);
# Allow heap profiling on debug builds.
userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_heap({
  domain
  -bpfloader
  -init
  -kernel
  -keystore
  -llkd
  -logd
  -logpersist
  -recovery
  -recovery_persist
  -recovery_refresh
  -ueventd
  -vendor_init
  -vold
})')

# As above, allow perf profiling most processes on debug builds.
# zygote is excluded as system-wide profiling could end up with it
# (unexpectedly) holding an open fd across a fork.
userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_perf({
  domain
  -bpfloader
  -init
  -kernel
  -keystore
  -llkd
  -logd
  -logpersist
  -recovery
  -recovery_persist
  -recovery_refresh
  -ueventd
  -vendor_init
  -vold
  -zygote
})')

# Everyone can access the IncFS list of features.
r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_fs_incfs_features);

# Path resolution access in cgroups.
allow domain cgroup:dir search;
allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:file w_file_perms;

allow domain cgroup_v2:dir search;
allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:dir w_dir_perms;
allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;

allow domain cgroup_rc_file:dir search;
allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
allow domain task_profiles_api_file:file r_file_perms;
allow domain vendor_task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow all domains to read sys.use_memfd to determine
# if memfd support can be used if device supports it
get_prop(domain, use_memfd_prop);

# Read access to sdkextensions props
get_prop(domain, module_sdkextensions_prop)

# Read access to bq configuration values
get_prop(domain, bq_config_prop);

# For now, everyone can access core property files
# Device specific properties are not granted by default
not_compatible_property(`
    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
    get_prop(domain, core_property_type)
    get_prop(domain, exported3_system_prop)
    get_prop(domain, vendor_default_prop)
')
compatible_property_only(`
    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, core_property_type)
    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_system_prop)
    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_camera_prop)
    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_log_prop)
    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_test_prop)
    get_prop({domain -coredomain -appdomain}, vendor_default_prop)
')

# Allow access to fsverity keyring.
allow domain kernel:key search;
# Allow access to keys in the fsverity keyring that were installed at boot.
allow domain fsverity_init:key search;
# For testing purposes, allow access to keys installed with su.
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow domain su:key search;
')

# Allow access to linkerconfig file
allow domain linkerconfig_file:dir search;
allow domain linkerconfig_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow all processes to check for the existence of the boringssl_self_test_marker files.
allow domain boringssl_self_test_marker:dir search;

# Allow all processes to connect to PRNG seeder daemon.
unix_socket_connect(domain, prng_seeder, prng_seeder)

# No domains other than a select few can access the misc_block_device. This
# block device is reserved for OTA use.
# Do not assert this rule on userdebug/eng builds, due to some devices using
# this partition for testing purposes.
neverallow {
  domain
  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain') # exclude debuggable builds
  -fastbootd
  -hal_bootctl_server
  -init
  -uncrypt
  -update_engine
  -vendor_init
  -vendor_misc_writer
  -vold
  -recovery
  -ueventd
  -mtectrl
} misc_block_device:blk_file { append link relabelfrom rename write open read ioctl lock };

# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
# with other UIDs to these allowlisted domains.
neverallow {
  domain
  -vold
  userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
  -dumpstate
  userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
  userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
  userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
  -storaged
  -system_server
} self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;

# Limit ability to generate hardware unique device ID attestations to priv_apps
neverallow { domain -priv_app -gmscore_app } *:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
neverallow { domain -priv_app -gmscore_app } *:keystore2_key gen_unique_id;
neverallow { domain -system_server } *:keystore2_key use_dev_id;
neverallow { domain -system_server } keystore:keystore2 { clear_ns lock reset unlock };

neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -vendor_init
  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
} debugfs_tracing_debug:file no_rw_file_perms;

# System_server owns dropbox data, and init creates/restorecons the directory
# Disallow direct access by other processes.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };

###
# Services should respect app sandboxes
neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
  -installd # creation of sandbox
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };

# Only the following processes should be directly accessing private app
# directories.
neverallow {
  domain
  -adbd
  -appdomain
  -app_zygote
  -dexoptanalyzer
  -installd
  -iorap_inode2filename
  -iorap_prefetcherd
  -profman
  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
  -runas
  -system_server
  -viewcompiler
  -zygote
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir *;

# Only apps should be modifying app data. installd is exempted for
# restorecon and package install/uninstall.
neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
  -installd
  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir ~r_dir_perms;

neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
  -app_zygote
  -installd
  -iorap_prefetcherd
  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file_class_set open;

neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
  -installd # creation of sandbox
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };

neverallow {
  domain
  -installd
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };

# The staging directory contains APEX and APK files. It is important to ensure
# that these files cannot be accessed by other domains to ensure that the files
# do not change between system_server staging the files and apexd processing
# the files.
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -system_server
  -apexd
  -installd
  -iorap_inode2filename
  -priv_app
  -virtualizationservice
} staging_data_file:dir *;
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -system_app
  -system_server
  -apexd
  -adbd
  -kernel
  -installd
  -iorap_inode2filename
  -priv_app
  -shell
  -virtualizationservice
  -crosvm
} staging_data_file:file *;
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -installd} staging_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
# apexd needs the link and unlink permissions, so list every `no_w_file_perms`
# except for `link` and `unlink`.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } staging_data_file:file
  { append create relabelfrom rename setattr write no_x_file_perms };

neverallow {
    domain
    -appdomain # for oemfs
    -bootanim # for oemfs
    -recovery # for /tmp/update_binary in tmpfs
} { fs_type -rootfs }:file execute;

#
# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few allowlisted domains.
# Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
# we want to avoid. See
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
#
neverallow {
    domain
    -appdomain
    with_asan(`-asan_extract')
    -iorap_prefetcherd
    -shell
    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
    -system_server_startup # for memfd backed executable regions
    -app_zygote
    -webview_zygote
    -zygote
    userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaextractor')
    userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaswcodec')
} {
    file_type
    -system_file_type
    -system_lib_file
    -system_linker_exec
    -vendor_file_type
    -exec_type
    -postinstall_file
}:file execute;

# Only init is allowed to write cgroup.rc file
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -vendor_init
} cgroup_rc_file:file no_w_file_perms;

# Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
neverallow {
  domain
  -init # TODO: limit init to relabelfrom for files
  -zygote
  -installd
  -postinstall_dexopt
  -cppreopts
  -dex2oat
  -otapreopt_slot
} dalvikcache_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;

neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -installd
  -postinstall_dexopt
  -cppreopts
  -dex2oat
  -zygote
  -otapreopt_slot
} dalvikcache_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;

# Only authorized processes should be writing to /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art as it
# contains boot class path and system server AOT artifacts following an ART APEX Mainline update.
neverallow {
  domain
  # art-related processes
  -composd
  -compos_fd_server
  -odrefresh
  -odsign
  # others
  -apexd
  -init
  -vold_prepare_subdirs
} apex_art_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;

neverallow {
  domain
  # art-related processes
  -composd
  -compos_fd_server
  -odrefresh
  -odsign
  # others
  -apexd
  -init
  -vold_prepare_subdirs
} apex_art_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;

# Protect most domains from executing arbitrary content from /data.
neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
} {
  data_file_type
  -apex_art_data_file
  -dalvikcache_data_file
  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
  -apk_data_file
}:file no_x_file_perms;

# Minimize dac_override and dac_read_search.
# Instead of granting them it is usually better to add the domain to
# a Unix group or change the permissions of a file.
define(`dac_override_allowed', `{
  apexd
  dnsmasq
  dumpstate
  init
  installd
  userdebug_or_eng(`llkd')
  lmkd
  migrate_legacy_obb_data
  netd
  postinstall_dexopt
  recovery
  rss_hwm_reset
  sdcardd
  tee
  ueventd
  uncrypt
  vendor_init
  vold
  vold_prepare_subdirs
  zygote
}')
neverallow ~dac_override_allowed self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
# Since the kernel checks dac_read_search before dac_override, domains that
# have dac_override should also have dac_read_search to eliminate spurious
# denials.  Some domains have dac_read_search without having dac_override, so
# this list should be a superset of the one above.
neverallow ~{
  dac_override_allowed
  iorap_inode2filename
  iorap_prefetcherd
  traced_perf
  traced_probes
  heapprofd
} self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;

# Limit what domains can mount filesystems or change their mount flags.
# sdcard_type (including vfat and exfat) and fusefs_type are exempt as a larger
# set of domains need this capability, including device-specific domains.
neverallow {
    domain
    -apexd
    recovery_only(`-fastbootd')
    -init
    -kernel
    -otapreopt_chroot
    -recovery
    -update_engine
    -vold
    -zygote
} { fs_type
    -sdcard_type
    -fusefs_type
}:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };

enforce_debugfs_restriction(`
  neverallow {
    domain userdebug_or_eng(`-init')
  } { debugfs_type -debugfs_tracing_debug }:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
')

# Limit raw I/O to these allowlisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
neverallow {
  domain
  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
  -kernel
  -gsid
  -init
  -recovery
  -ueventd
  -uncrypt
  -tee
  -hal_bootctl_server
  -fastbootd
} self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;

# Limit directory operations that doesn't need to do app data isolation.
neverallow {
  domain
  -fsck
  -init
  -installd
  -zygote
} mirror_data_file:dir *;

# This property is being removed. Remove remaining access.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:property_service set;
neverallow { domain -dumpstate -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:file read;

# Only core domains are allowed to access package_manager properties
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } pm_prop:property_service set;
neverallow { domain -coredomain } pm_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;

# Do not allow reading the last boot timestamp from system properties
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -dumpstate } firstboot_prop:file r_file_perms;

# Kprobes should only be used by adb root
neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } debugfs_kprobes:file *;

# On TREBLE devices, most coredomains should not access vendor_files.
# TODO(b/71553434): Remove exceptions here.
full_treble_only(`
  neverallow {
    coredomain
    -appdomain
    -bootanim
    -crash_dump
    -heapprofd
    userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
    -init
    -iorap_inode2filename
    -iorap_prefetcherd
    -kernel
    userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
    -traced_perf
    -ueventd
  } vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms open };
')

# Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate communications to core domain sockets
full_treble_only(`
  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
    domain
    -coredomain
    -appdomain
    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
  }, {
    coredomain
    -logd # Logging by writing to logd Unix domain socket is public API
    -netd # netdomain needs this
    -mdnsd # netdomain needs this
    -prng_seeder # Any process using libcrypto needs this
    userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
    -init
    -tombstoned # linker to tombstoned
    userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
    userdebug_or_eng(`-traced')
    userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
  });
')

full_treble_only(`
  # Do not allow system components access to /vendor files except for the
  # ones allowed here.
  neverallow {
    coredomain
    # TODO(b/37168747): clean up fwk access to /vendor
    -crash_dump
    -crosvm # loads vendor-specific disk images
    -init # starts vendor executables
    -iorap_inode2filename
    -iorap_prefetcherd
    -kernel # loads /vendor/firmware
    -heapprofd
    userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
    -shell
    userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
    -system_executes_vendor_violators
    -traced_perf # library/binary access for symbolization
    -ueventd # reads /vendor/ueventd.rc
    -vold # loads incremental fs driver
  } {
    vendor_file_type
    -same_process_hal_file
    -vendor_app_file
    -vendor_apex_file
    -vendor_configs_file
    -vendor_service_contexts_file
    -vendor_framework_file
    -vendor_idc_file
    -vendor_keychars_file
    -vendor_keylayout_file
    -vendor_overlay_file
    -vendor_public_framework_file
    -vendor_public_lib_file
    -vendor_task_profiles_file
    -vendor_uuid_mapping_config_file
    -vndk_sp_file
  }:file *;
')

# mlsvendorcompat is only for compatibility support for older vendor
# images, and should not be granted to any domain in current policy.
# (Every domain is allowed self:fork, so this will trigger if the
# intsersection of domain & mlsvendorcompat is not empty.)
neverallow domain mlsvendorcompat:process fork;

# Only init and otapreopt_chroot should be mounting filesystems on locations
# labeled system or vendor (/product and /vendor respectively).
neverallow { domain -init -otapreopt_chroot } { system_file_type vendor_file_type }:dir_file_class_set mounton;

# Only allow init and vendor_init to read/write mm_events properties
# NOTE: dumpstate is allowed to read any system property
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -vendor_init
  -dumpstate
} mm_events_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;

# Allow the tracing daemon and callstack sampler to use kallsyms to symbolize
# kernel traces. Addresses are not disclosed, they are repalced with symbol
# names (if available). Traces don't disclose KASLR.
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
  -vendor_init
  userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
  -traced_probes
  -traced_perf
} proc_kallsyms:file { open read };

# debugfs_kcov type is not included in this neverallow statement since the KCOV
# tool uses it for kernel fuzzing.
# vendor_modprobe is also exempted since the kernel modules it loads may create
# debugfs files in its context.
enforce_debugfs_restriction(`
  neverallow {
    domain
    -vendor_modprobe
    userdebug_or_eng(`
      -init
      -hal_dumpstate
    ')
  } { debugfs_type
      userdebug_or_eng(`-debugfs_kcov')
      -tracefs_type
  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
')

# Restrict write access to etm sysfs interface.
neverallow { domain -ueventd -vendor_init } sysfs_devices_cs_etm:file no_w_file_perms;

# Restrict write access to shell owned files. The /data/local/tmp directory is
# untrustworthy, and non-allowed domains should not be trusting any content in
# those directories. We allow shell files to be passed around by file
# descriptor, but not directly opened.
neverallow {
  domain
  -adbd
  -appdomain
  -dumpstate
  -installd
  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
  userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationservice')
  userdebug_or_eng(`-crosvm')
} shell_data_file:file open;

# respect system_app sandboxes
neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
  -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
  -installd # creation of app sandbox
  -iorap_inode2filename
  -traced_probes # resolve inodes for i/o tracing.
                 # only needs open and read, the rest is neverallow in
                 # traced_probes.te.
} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
neverallow {
  isolated_app
  ephemeral_app
  priv_app
  sdk_sandbox
  untrusted_app_all
} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };