xref: /aosp_15_r20/system/sepolicy/prebuilts/api/31.0/private/simpleperf.te (revision e4a36f4174b17bbab9dc043f4a65dc8d87377290)

# Domain used when running /system/bin/simpleperf to profile a specific app.
# Entered either by the app itself exec-ing the binary, or through
# simpleperf_app_runner (with shell as its origin). Certain other domains
# (runas_app, shell) can also exec this binary without a domain transition.
typeattribute simpleperf coredomain;
type simpleperf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;

domain_auto_trans({ untrusted_app_all -runas_app }, simpleperf_exec, simpleperf)

# When running in this domain, simpleperf is scoped to profiling an individual
# app. The necessary MAC permissions for profiling are more maintainable and
# consistent if simpleperf is marked as an app domain as well (as, for example,
# it will then see the same set of system libraries as the app).
app_domain(simpleperf)
untrusted_app_domain(simpleperf)

# Allow ptrace attach to the target app, for reading JIT debug info (using
# process_vm_readv) during unwinding and symbolization.
allow simpleperf untrusted_app_all:process ptrace;

# Allow using perf_event_open syscall for profiling the target app.
allow simpleperf self:perf_event { open read write kernel };

# Allow /proc/<pid> access for the target app (for example, when trying to
# discover it by cmdline).
r_dir_file(simpleperf, untrusted_app_all)

# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
# the same domain as their respective processes, most of which this domain is
# not allowed to see.
dontaudit simpleperf domain:dir search;

# Neverallows:

# Profiling must be confined to the scope of an individual app.
neverallow simpleperf self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };