xref: /aosp_15_r20/system/sepolicy/prebuilts/api/29.0/private/heapprofd.te (revision e4a36f4174b17bbab9dc043f4a65dc8d87377290)

# Android heap profiling daemon. go/heapprofd.
#
# On user builds, this daemon is responsible for receiving the initial
# profiling configuration, finding matching target processes (if profiling by
# process name), and sending the activation signal to them (+ setting system
# properties for new processes to start profiling from startup). When profiling
# is triggered in a process, it spawns a private heapprofd subprocess (in its
# own SELinux domain), which will exclusively handle profiling of its parent.
#
# On debug builds, this central daemon performs profiling for all target
# processes (which talk directly to this daemon).
type heapprofd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
type heapprofd_tmpfs, file_type;

init_daemon_domain(heapprofd)
tmpfs_domain(heapprofd)

# Allow apps in other MLS contexts (for multi-user) to access
# shared memory buffers created by heapprofd.
typeattribute heapprofd_tmpfs mlstrustedobject;

set_prop(heapprofd, heapprofd_prop);

# Necessary for /proc/[pid]/cmdline access & sending signals.
typeattribute heapprofd mlstrustedsubject;

# Allow sending signals to processes. This excludes SIGKILL, SIGSTOP and
# SIGCHLD, which are controlled by separate permissions.
allow heapprofd self:capability kill;

# When scanning /proc/[pid]/cmdline to find matching processes for by-name
# profiling, only allowlisted domains will be allowed by SELinux. Avoid
# spamming logs with denials for entries that we can not access.
dontaudit heapprofd domain:dir { search open };

# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced daemon. This requires connecting to
# its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
allow heapprofd traced:fd use;
allow heapprofd traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
unix_socket_connect(heapprofd, traced_producer, traced)

# When handling profiling for all processes, heapprofd needs to read
# executables/libraries/etc to do stack unwinding.
userdebug_or_eng(`
  r_dir_file(heapprofd, nativetest_data_file)
  r_dir_file(heapprofd, system_file_type)
  r_dir_file(heapprofd, apk_data_file)
  r_dir_file(heapprofd, dalvikcache_data_file)
  r_dir_file(heapprofd, vendor_file_type)
  # Some dex files are not world-readable.
  # We are still constrained by the SELinux rules above.
  allow heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
')

# This is going to happen on user but is benign because central heapprofd
# does not actually need these permission.
# If the dac_read_search capability check is rejected, the kernel then tries
# to perform a dac_override capability check, so we need to dontaudit that
# as well.
dontaudit heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_read_search dac_override };

never_profile_heap(`{
  bpfloader
  init
  kernel
  keystore
  llkd
  logd
  ueventd
  vendor_init
  vold
}')

full_treble_only(`
  neverallow heapprofd vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
')