Searched full:attack (Results 1 – 25 of 211) sorted by relevance
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| /linux-6.14.4/kernel/configs/ |
| D | hardening.config | 4 # attack surface reduction options. They are expected to have low (or
67 # https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-…
83 # Provide userspace with seccomp BPF API for syscall attack surface reduction.
94 # Attack surface reduction: do not autoload TTY line disciplines.
106 # Attack surface reduction: Use the modern PTY interface (devpts) only.
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| /linux-6.14.4/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ |
| D | spectre.rst | 69 The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage
92 The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative
116 the attack revealing useful data.
118 One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
123 return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return
134 Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
141 Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
146 Attack scenarios
149 The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may
150 not cover all possible attack vectors.
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| D | l1tf.rst | 56 similar to the Meltdown attack.
59 allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
60 works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
65 Attack scenarios
73 application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
78 The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
92 PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
98 only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
99 on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
103 If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
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| D | gather_data_sampling.rst | 17 attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
27 Attack scenarios
44 attack, and re-enable it.
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| D | srso.rst | 68 does address User->User and VM->VM attack vectors.
124 attack vectors, including the local User->Kernel one.
130 new attack vectors appear.
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| D | mds.rst | 55 allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
64 Attack scenarios
74 the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
212 to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
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| D | cross-thread-rsb.rst | 58 Attack scenarios
61 An attack can be mounted on affected processors by performing a series of CALL
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| /linux-6.14.4/Documentation/security/ |
| D | self-protection.rst | 9 and actively detecting attack attempts. Not all topics are explored in
20 attack surface. (Especially when they have the ability to load arbitrary
31 Attack Surface Reduction
114 bug to an attack.
127 unexpectedly extend the available attack surface. (The on-demand loading
146 to gain execution control during an attack, By far the most commonly
149 kind of attack exist, and protections exist to defend against them.
164 A less well understood attack is using a bug that triggers the
166 allocations. With this attack it is possible to write beyond the end of
200 defense, in that an attack must gather enough information about a
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| D | snp-tdx-threat-model.rst | 19 additional attack vectors that arise in the confidential computing space
91 | External attack | | Interfaces |
118 Regarding external attack vectors, it is interesting to note that in most
131 CoCo VM TCB due to its large SW attack surface. It is important to note
144 | External attack | | | Interfaces | |
161 leverage this access to attack the guest, the CoCo systems mitigate such
189 The **Linux CoCo VM attack surface** is any interface exposed from a CoCo
232 virtual devices. This allows any attack against confidentiality,
240 side-channel and/or transient execution attack vectors.
245 difference with the previous attack vector (malformed runtime input)
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| D | ipe.rst | 33 1. Protection of additional attack vectors:
36 to offline attack against the aforementioned specific data files.
55 additional protection against a hostile block device. In such an attack,
60 access), this attack is mitigated.
79 attack against it).
182 high security bar, as anything signed can be used to attack integrity
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| D | landlock.rst | 17 expose a minimal attack surface.
86 deputy attack).
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| /linux-6.14.4/Documentation/tee/ |
| D | op-tee.rst | 111 There are additional attack vectors/mitigations for the kernel that should be
116 * Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of
125 * Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the
134 * Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load
137 * Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack
144 * Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to
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| /linux-6.14.4/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/ |
| D | maxim,max98504.yaml | 44 Brownout attenuation to the speaker gain applied during the "attack hold"
47 maxim,brownout-attack-hold-ms:
51 Brownout attack hold phase time in ms, VBATBROWN_ATTK_HOLD, register 0x0018.
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| D | cs35l36.txt | 113 - cirrus,cirrus,vpbr-atk-rate : Attenuation attack step rate. Configures the
132 - cirrus,vpbr-mute-en : During the attack state, if the vpbr-max-attn value
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| /linux-6.14.4/include/linux/mfd/ |
| D | ac100.h | 96 #define AC100_ADC_DAP_L_A_T 0x8b /* Left Attack Time */
98 #define AC100_ADC_DAP_R_A_T 0x8d /* Right Attack Time */
118 #define AC100_DAC_DAP_H_G_A_T_C 0xa9 /* High Gain Attack Time Coef */
119 #define AC100_DAC_DAP_L_G_A_T_C 0xaa /* Low Gain Attack Time Coef */
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| /linux-6.14.4/Documentation/input/devices/ |
| D | iforce-protocol.rst | 126 0a-0b Address of attack and fade parameters, or ffff if none.
139 Attack and fade
147 02-03 Duration of attack (little endian encoding, in ms)
148 04 Level at end of attack. Signed byte.
356 - attack and fade : 0e
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| /linux-6.14.4/Documentation/security/tpm/ |
| D | tpm-security.rst | 8 packet alteration attacks (called passive and active interposer attack
28 Most recently the same `attack against TPM based Linux disk
34 try to insure that if we can't prevent the attack then at least we can
46 which would be an annoying denial of service attack. However, there
47 are two, more serious, classes of attack aimed at entities sealed to
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| /linux-6.14.4/sound/soc/codecs/ |
| D | cs42l73.h | 53 #define CS42L73_LIMARATEHL 0x26 /* Lmtr Attack Rate HP/Line. */
56 #define CS42L73_LIMARATESPK 0x29 /* Lmtr Attack Rate Spkphone [A]. */
59 #define CS42L73_LIMARATEESL 0x2C /* Lmtr Attack Rate */
62 #define CS42L73_ALCARATE 0x2F /* ALC Enable, Attack Rate AB. */
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| /linux-6.14.4/include/uapi/sound/ |
| D | asound_fm.h | 39 unsigned char attack; /* 4 bits: attack rate */ member
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| /linux-6.14.4/arch/arm/mm/ |
| D | copypage-v6.c | 28 * attack the kernel's existing mapping of these pages.
44 * attack the kernel's existing mapping of this page.
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| /linux-6.14.4/drivers/firmware/efi/ |
| D | Kconfig | 171 bool "Reset memory attack mitigation"
175 using the TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation specification. This
203 PCI devices from being able to attack the OS via DMA. However, since
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| /linux-6.14.4/net/ipv4/ |
| D | Kconfig | 99 attack or a misconfigured system somewhere. The information is
271 Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN
272 flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote
274 attack and requires very little work from the attacker, who can
277 SYN cookies provide protection against this type of attack. If you
280 continue to connect, even when your machine is under attack. There
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| /linux-6.14.4/arch/powerpc/configs/ |
| D | hardening.config | 6 # Attack surface reduction.
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| /linux-6.14.4/arch/arm/configs/ |
| D | hardening.config | 6 # Dangerous; old interfaces and needless additional attack surface.
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| /linux-6.14.4/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/ |
| D | rename_attack_test.c | 38 char dirname[] = "/tmp/ksft-openat2-rename-attack.XXXXXX"; in setup_testdir()
139 resultfn("rename attack with %s (%d runs, got %d escapes)\n", in test_rename_attack()
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