1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
28  * a compiler warning when CONFIG_FRAME_WARN is set. Then make sure we
44  * - function marked noinline
45  * - stack variables are marked volatile
46  * - stack variables are written (memset()) and read (buf[..] passed as arg)
47  * - function may have external effects (memzero_explicit())
48  * - no tail recursion possible
59 		ret = recursive_loop((int)buf[remaining % sizeof(buf)] - 1);  in recursive_loop()
84 	 * have interrupts disabled and cannot take a regular IPI.  in panic_stop_irqoff_fn()
86 	 * The last CPU which enters here will trigger a panic, and as all CPUs  in panic_stop_irqoff_fn()
87 	 * cannot take a regular IPI, we'll only be able to stop secondaries if  in panic_stop_irqoff_fn()
154 /* Same as above but will only get a canary with -fstack-protector-strong */
180 	pr_info("Stack offset: %d\n", (int)(stack_addr - (uintptr_t)&magic));  in lkdtm_REPORT_STACK()
194 	/* Do our best to find the canary in a 16 word window ... */  in __lkdtm_REPORT_STACK_CANARY()
198 		if (*canary == current->stack_canary)  in __lkdtm_REPORT_STACK_CANARY()
208 		 * we're either using a global canary or the stack frame  in __lkdtm_REPORT_STACK_CANARY()
232 		pr_warn("ERROR: saw pid %d again -- please use a new pid\n", pid);  in __lkdtm_REPORT_STACK_CANARY()
262 	static u8 data[5] __attribute__((aligned(4))) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};  in lkdtm_UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE()
333 static volatile unsigned int huge = INT_MAX - 2;
395 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(checked->data); i++)  in lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS()
396 		checked->data[i] = 'A';  in lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS()
402 		not_checked->data[i] = 'A';  in lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS()
405 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(checked->data) + 1; i++)  in lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS()
406 		checked->data[i] = 'B';  in lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS()
435 	inst->count = fam_count;  in lkdtm_FAM_BOUNDS()
437 	inst->array[1] = fam_count;  in lkdtm_FAM_BOUNDS()
438 	ignored = inst->array[1];  in lkdtm_FAM_BOUNDS()
441 	inst->array[fam_count] = fam_count;  in lkdtm_FAM_BOUNDS()
442 	ignored = inst->array[fam_count];  in lkdtm_FAM_BOUNDS()
449 …pr_warn("This is expected since this %s was built with a compiler that does not support __counted_…  in lkdtm_FAM_BOUNDS()
473 	 *	test_head.next->prev = &good.node  in lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD()
524 /* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a leading guard page */
528 	const unsigned char *ptr = stack - 1;  in lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING()
538 /* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a trailing guard page */
581 	 * To test the post-write pinning verification we need to call  in lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP()
594 		    insn[i+2] == 0xf8 && insn[i+3] == 0x0f &&  in lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP()
615 	pr_err("XFAIL: this test is x86_64-only\n");  in lkdtm_UNSET_SMEP()
624 	 * a GDT TLS slot, which is okay because the current task will die  in lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT()
628 		.type = 3,	/* expand-up, writable, accessed data */  in lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT()
630 		.d = 1,		/* 32-bit */  in lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT()
640 	 * Put our zero-limit segment in SS and then trigger a fault.  The  in lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT()
641 	 * 4-byte access to (%esp) will fault with #SS, and the attempt to  in lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT()
645 	 * would also double-fault, resulting in the NMI or MCE being lost.  in lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT()
648 		      "r" ((unsigned short)(GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN << 3)));  in lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT()
652 	pr_err("XFAIL: this test is ia32-only\n");  in lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT()
683 	 * PAC is a hash value computed from input keys, return address and  in lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC()
684 	 * stack pointer. As pac has fewer bits so there is a chance of  in lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC()
692 	pr_err("XFAIL: this test is arm64-only\n");  in lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC()