1130 		 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures  in retbleed_select_mitigation()
1131 		 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,  in retbleed_select_mitigation()
1562 /* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
1584 	 * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1587 	 * 1) RSB underflow  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1589 	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1592 	 * the RSB.  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1595 	 * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1597 	 * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1599 	 * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1600 	 * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required,  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1620 		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1624 	pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");  in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit()
1804 	 * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1806 	 * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1820 	 * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1821 	 * context switch.  In general there are two types of RSB attacks  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1824 	 * 1) RSB underflow  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1826 	 *    Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB".  When the RSB is empty,  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1831 	 *    regardless of the state of the RSB.  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1835 	 *    properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1838 	 *    The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling.  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1840 	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1843 	 *    'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1850 	 *    RSB clearing.  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1852 	 * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
1858 	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");  in spectre_v2_select_mitigation()
2660 				 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures  in srso_select_mitigation()
2661 				 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,  in srso_select_mitigation()
2679 				 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures  in srso_select_mitigation()
2680 				 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,  in srso_select_mitigation()
2890 			  boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? "; RSB filling" : "",  in spectre_v2_show_state()